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STUDENT NOTES
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. A CRITICISM OF THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
In the recent case of Berndt v. Lusher, et aL,' a husband died in-
testate owning four parcels of land which descended to his widow.
The widow entered into four contracts of sale to different purchasers
each of whom made a down payment and entered into possession. The
widow died intestate, and without issue, before the contracts were per-
formed, leaving brothers and sisters as heirs. The widow's adminis-
trator collected what was due on the contracts. There was a balance
still remaining due on two of the contracts, but no default in the atip-
ulated payments had been made by any purchaser. A sister of the
husband claims a one-half interest in the estate of the widow, by rea-
son of a statute,2 if the widow died in possession of the identical prop-
erty which came to her from her husband. The administrator of the
widow's estate brought suit to secure the direction and judgment of
the court as to the distribution of the estate. Held, the real estate
which the widow had received from her husband became converted
into personalty by the execution of the contracts of purchase and
taking possession thereunder by the various purchasers, and on her
death the right thereto passed to her administrator to be distributed
to her brothers and sisters as next of kin. The court said, "Money
directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and land directed to
be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that species of
property into which they are directed to be converted; and this in
whatever manner the direction is given; whether by will, by way of
contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and whether
the money is actually deposited or only covenanted to be paid;
whether the land is actually conveyed or only agreed to be conveyed,
the owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land
money, or money land."
Substantially the same language has been used in the Kentucky
cases dealing with this problem.'
This doctrine of equitable conversion by contract was stated by
Jessel, M. R., in Lysaght v. Edwards," as follows, "Being a valid con-
tract, it has this remarkable effect, that it converts the estate, so to
say, in equity; it makes the purchase-money a part of the personal
estate of the vendor, and it makes the land a part of the real estate
140 Ohio App. 172, 178 N. E. 14 (1931).
'Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 8577.
sLoughborough's Executors v. Loughborough's Devisee, 53 Ky.
(14 B. Mon.) 441 (1854); Collins v. Champ's Heirs, 54 Ky. (15 B.
Mon.) 118 (1854).
' I. R. 2 Ch. D. 499, 507 (1876).
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of the vendee; and therefore all these cases of constructive conversion
are founded simply on this, that a valid contract actually changes the
ownership of the estate in equity."
The basis for this different effect of a contract in equity Is stated
as follows: "The doctrine of equitable conversion rests on the pre-
sumed intention of the owner of the property and on the maxim that
equity regards as done what ought to be done."' To work an equita-
ble conversion by contract it is necessary that the contract be valid
and binding, and such as a court will specifically enforce against an
unwilling purchaser.6
Since this is true it seems clear that the equitable conversion is
due not to the "presumed- intention" of the parties to the contract, but
to operation of law; if equity will decree specific performance an equi-
table conversion occurs; if such a decree is impossible there can be
no conversion. Maxims are seldom a reason, but only an excuse. To
say that a purchaser having a specifically enforceable contract right
to obtain land at a future date upon paying the purchase price is the
immediate owner because "equity regards as done what ought to be
done" is in effect saying that two things entirely different are the
same thing. "Only the hoary age and frequent repetition of the maxim
prevents a general recognition of its absurdity--and one who accepts
the maxim denies himself the effort of further thought.'"
Some cases treat the vendor as holding the land in trust for the
purchaser, and the purchaser as trustee of the purchase-money for the
vendor.8 There are several reasons why the vendor-purchaser relation-
ship is not properly analogous to the trustee situation. A trustee is
not entitled to profit by his position.' Therefore, the vendor Is not a
trustee as to the legal title for the purchaser, for he is entitled to the
rents and profits while he Is in possession which is usually until the
date of conveyance." The vendor holds the legal title as security for
the purchase price. If the vendor insures the property he Is allowed
'Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469, 480, 97
N. E. 43, 46 (1911).
6Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 47 So. 106 (1908); Rodish v.
Moore, 266 Ill. 106, 107 N. E. 108 (1914); Keep v. Miller, 42 N. J. Eq.
100, 6 Atl. 495 (1886); Mills v. Harris, 104 N. C. 626, 10 S. E. 704
(1890); In re Thomas, L. R. 34. Ch. D. 166 (1886); Lysaght v. Ed-
wards, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 499 (1876); Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. Jr.
341 (1802); In re Bernhard, 134 Iowa 603, 112 N. W. 86 (1907).
'2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 929, p. 1767.
8 Keep v. Miller, 42 N. J. Eq. 100, 6 AtI. 495 (1886); House v. Jack-
son, 24 Ore. 89, 32 Pac. 1027 (1893); Pollexfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272
(1745); Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572 (1738).
9Richardson's Admrs. v. Spencer, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 450 (1857-);
Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 89, 35 Am. Dec. 296 (1832).
"Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. Jr. 591 (1808); Lumsden v. Fraser,
12 Sim. 263 (1841).
"Foster v. Deacon, 3 Madd. 394 (1818); Carrodus v. Sharp, 20
Beav. 56 (1855); Clarke v. Ramuz, L. R. 2 Q. B. 456 (1891).
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to hold the proceeds for his own benefit.s The vendor has too
many beneficial interests to be a trustee. The purchaser is said
to be the trustee of the purchase-money; yet he does not hold any
specific property for the vendor. In fact, the purchaser is a mere
debtor with his sole obligation in law and equity being to pay
the purchase-money when the vendor conveys the legal title, In
the case of the usual contract. In 1738 when Lord Hardwicke said
that "the vendor is from the time of the contract, considered as trus-
tee for the purchaser, and the vendee, as to the money, a trustee for
the vendor,""3 it was the law of England that the promises in all bi-
lateral contracts, In the absence of express conditions, were independ-
ent." Then, the vendor's obligation in law, as well as in equity was
absolute, and it was his duty to convey to the purchaser whether the
purchase-money was paid or not. Under such a state of law, a vendor
in possession was more nearly a trustee, even though he was entitled
to the rents and profits, than he is today when the promises in bi-
lateral contracts are mutually dependent, even in the absence of
express conditions, which has been the law ever since Lord Mansfield's
decision in Kingston v. Preston,15 handed down some thirty-five yeara
after Lord Hardwicke's decision. If implied conditions had been a
part of the English law at an earlier date it is doubtful if the equity
doctrine would ever have arisen. At least, this is a striking example
of the common habit, indulged in by many courts, of following prece-
dents when the reason for the rule no longer exists. Some cases have
recognized the incongruity in the analogy to the trustee relation-
ship 16 The relationship between a vendor and purchaser has also been
called that of a mortgagee-mortgagor.' In at least two important
particulars this analogy is not sound. A vendor is allowed to make
time of the essence of the contract; he may even do this at a subse-
quent time if he gives reasonable notice to the purchaser, and such
conditions will generally be enforced by a court of equity if forfeitures
and other inequitable results are avoided.5 But in mortgage law no
agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee for non-payment
on time will be enforced." There is one qualification of this principle
'5Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881); Wood v. Insurance
Co., 46 N. Y. 421 (1871). Contra: Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346,
36 S. E. 796 (1900); Skinner. etc. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85
(1900).
"Green v. Smith, I Atk. 572 (1738).
"Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wins. Saunders 319 (1669).
152 Doug. 689, S. C. Lofft 194 (1773).
' Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, 6 (1881), per Cotton L. J.
and per Brett, L. J., L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, 10 (1881).T Lowery v. Patterson, 75 Ala. 109, 111 (1883); Straus v. White,
66 Ark. 167, 170, 51 S. 'W. 64, 65 (1899); Stevenson v. Loehn, 57 Inl.
509, 511 (1871).
'5Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio State 326, 59 Am. Dec. 677 (1853),
and cases cited therein.
"Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. S. 332, 24 L. Ed. 775 (1877); Fields v.
Helms,.82 Ala. 449, 3 So. 106 (1887); Marshall v. Thompson, 39 Minn.
137, 39 N. W. 309 (1888).
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in the law of vendor and purchaser where the purchaser is in posseb-
sion, but only in such cases. A purchaser is not entitled to possession
unless the contract expressly gives him such a right.2 And a purchaser
is not entitled to the rents and profits until he is entitled to posses-
sion, although he is entitled to them thereafter.1
The problem is to explain the result reached in the so-called
"equitable conversion" cases using other principles which are sound."
When an ordinary bilateral contract for the sale and purchase of land
is made, which is specifically enforceable in a court of equity, certain
rights and obligations arise. The vendor has two contract rights;
one is to sue the purchaser at common law for breach of contract if
he refuses to perform; the other is to compel the purchaser to pay the
purchase-money and receive a conveyance of the land., The vendor
also has an equitable right to hold the legal title as security for the
purchasemoney. His obligation is to convey the land when the pur-
chase-money has been paid. The purchaser's sole obligation is to pay
the purchase-money when the land is conveyed. He, too, has two
contract rights; one to sue at common-law for breach if the vendor
refuses to perform; the other a specifically enforceable right to'obtain
a conveyance upon paying the purchase-money,1 which is a specific
property right.n Since the purchaser does have this specific property
right in equity he can obtain a conveyance from a subsequent pur-
2 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 937, p. 1780.
2 Clarke v. Ramuz, L. R. 2. Q. B. 456, 463 (1891); Gaven v. Hagen,
15 Cal. 208 (1860); Williams v. Forbes, 47 Ill. 148 (1868).
2Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, 11 (1881); Tucker v. M-
Laughlin-Farrar Co., 36 Okla. 321, 129 Pac. 5 (1912), and cases note 21.
-Buck v. Duvall, 11 Ga. App. 853, 76 N. E. 1053 (1912); Mason v.
Chambers, 19 Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 318 (1826); Baxter v. Brand, 36 Ky.
(6 Dana) 296 (1838).
2Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913), 13 Col. L. R.
369.
, Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 8 U. S. - (L. Ed.) 120 (1831);
Morgan v. Eastman, 59 Fla. 562, 52 So. 305 (1910); Jones v. Newhall,
115 Mass. 244 (1874).
Jones v. Newhall, 115 Mass. 244 (1874).
2 "Juridical rights are all deductions from juridical remedies;
hence, as soon as it became settled that a purchaser could get the
remedfy of specific performance of a contract to convey land, the in-
ference or deduction was that there was already a specifically enforce-
able right to the property which was the basis for his suit. Before a
remedy is once given in any particular class of cases there may be an
interest which should be protected, but no right can be said to arise
until such protection is given. After the remedy is once given we
infer the existence of a right before the suit was brought: and If the
decision is acquiesced in as representing the probable future action of
the courts in such cases, the right in similar cases is then thought
of as existing before any remedy is even sought. Where a right is
given by statute the inference above indicated is unnecessary." Clark,
Principles of Equity, Sec. 83, n. 1.
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chaser with notice from the vendor," or a donee without notice.5
But before the contract is performed the vendor dies. Since the legal
ownership of a contract is personal property it passes to the vendor's
personal representative vesting in him the rights of the vendor. The
land will devolve upon the heir of the vendor, but the heir takes the
land subject to the purchaser's specific property right, because he is
in the exact position of a donee. The legal title is now in the heir but
this he holds subject to the personal representative's equitable right to
have it held as security for the purchase-money as an incident to the
personal claim which the personal representative holds."
The personal representative could not bring a suit at law for
breach against the purchaser for, with the land and the legal title
held by the heir, he cannot show the ability and willingness to con-
vey on his own part necessary to put the purchaser in default. The
only remedy Is to bring a bill in equity for specific performance nam-
ing the purchaser as defendant, and the vendor's heir as co-
defendant. All three are necessary parties. The personal representa-
tive having the rights of the vendor is the person entitled to receive
the purchase-money;s he is the only person who can give a receipt for
the money and release his right to have the legal title held as security
for the purchase-money. The purchaser because he is the person ob-
ligated to pay the purchase-money and the one having the right to
receive the conveyance. The heir 5 because he is the party holding the
legal title and the land and must convey it because he is in the posi-
tion of a donee. When the specific performance is decreed the pur-
chaser will receive the land conveyed to him by the heir in return for
the purchase-money paid to the legal representative. The result will
be the same if the purchaser is the party seeking specific performance
of the contract.
The result is reached because the court of equity actually decrees
specific performance of the contract and not because of the application
of a legal fiction. The most that can be said for the doctrine of equi-
table conversion is that it is a result and not a cause.
JomE GEn.
-"Chicago Co. v. Hay, 119 Ill. 507, 10 N. E. 34 (1887); Mansfield
v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass. 304, 17 N. E. 544 (1888); Page v. Martin, 45
N. J. Eq. 585, 20 Atl. 46 (1890).
"Martin v. Seemore, 1 Ch. Cas. 170 (1670); Caborn v. Godfrey, 3
Desaus (S. C. Eq.) 514 (1813); McCullom v. Mackrell, 13 S. Dak. 262,
83 N. W. 255 (1900).
"This Is exactly like the right of an assignee of a claim secured
by a mortgage although It was not assigned. Danser v. Warwick, 33
N. J. Eq. 133 (1880).
nRoberts v. Marchant, 1 Phillip 370 (1843); Townsend v. Champ-
erone, 9 Price 130 (1821).
"Roberts v. Marchant, 1 Phillip 370 (1843).
